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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VINCENT CHIODO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

BEAR RIVER TELEPHONE
COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10473

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This reply brief is filed pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 75 (p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and will be limited to answering new matters set forth
in respondent's brief.
Argument

I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN

(~lTESTION 'VAS NOT AN ANNUNITY AND

WAS TERMINABLE FOR GOOD CAUSE.

1

Although respondent under the "Statement Of
Kind Of Case" (Br. 1-2) states that his contention
at the trial level was that the contract in question provided him "a guaranteed employment for 10 years
with no right in Bear River to terminate his employment
or, at least, the payments required thereunder" this
contention is not an issue before this Court. Respondent
agrees under point 1 of his argument (Br. 20) that
the trial court did determine that the employment agreement could be terminated for good cause and while he
wistfully recalls this theory (Br. 22 and 55-56), the
respondent has not attempted to contest the trial court's
determination and has taken no cross appeal on this
issue. It is, therefore, clear that the primary issue
before this Court is whether Vincent Chiodo's actions
as established by defendant-appellant constitute legal
justification for the termination of his employment
contract.
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 52
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND MUST BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER 'VITH THE ORAL OPINION OF
THE COURT BELOW.
Respondent, on page 44 of his brief, cites this
Court's opinion in Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade,
92 Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070, 1075 (1936), for the propo·
sition that the oral or written opinion of the trial court
cannot be looked to to ascertain what the trial court
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has decided once findings have been entered. In that
case, decided long before Rule 52 was adopted, the
trial court had not made any findings and this Court
concluded that no reviewable decision had been entered
until findings and a judgment were made and filed.
It also stated that the oral opinion of the Court could
not be substituted for findings. However, it neither
said nor implied that inadequate findings could not be
examined in light of the court's oral opinion, for such
is not the law. Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co.,
4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956).
There are two basic reasons why respondent's claim
of sanctity for the Findings in this case is without merit
-both having their basis in Rule 52, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
In the first place the findings were prepared by
counsel for plaintiff and adopted verbatim by the trial
court. The Supreme Court of the United States has
recently commented on this aspect of appellate review
of findings drafted by counsel and mechanically adopted
by the trial court contrary to the provisions of Rule
52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similar
to Utah Rule 52.
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
U.S. 651, 656-657 (1964), the Court said:
"There was a trial, and after oral argument
the judge announced from the bench that judgment would be for appellees and that he would
not write an opinion. He told counsel for ap-
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pellees 'Prepare the findings and conclusiou~
and judgment.' They obeyed, submitting 130
findings of fact and one conclusion of law, all
of which, we are advised, the District Court
adopted verbatim. Those findings, though not
the product of the workings of the district
judge's mind, are formally his; they are not to
be rejected out-of-hand, and they will stand if
supported by evidence. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 US 173, 184-185, 89
L ed 160, 169, 65 S Ct 254. Those drawn with
the insight of a disinterested mind are, however,
more helpful to the appellate court. 4 See 2B
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright ed. 1961} § ll24. Moreover,
these detailed findings were 'mechanically adopted,' to use the phrase of the late Judge Frank
in United States v. Forness, 125 F2d 928, 942,
and do not reveal the discerning line for decision of the basic issue in the case."
Footnote 4 to the opinion is as follows:
"4. Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
said:
" 'Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 52
says the court shall prepare the findings. "The
court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law." We all know
what has happened. Many courts simply decide the case in favor of the plaintiff or the
defendant, have him prepare the findings of
fact and conclusions of law and sign them.
This has been denounced by every court of
appeals save one. This is an abandonment of
the duty and the trust that has been placed
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in the judge by these rules. It is a noncompliance with Rule 52 specifically and it betrays
the primary purpose of Rule 52-the primary
purpose being that the preparation of these
findings by the judge shall assist in the adjudication of the lawsuit.
" 'I suggest to you strongly that you avoid
as far as you possibly can simply signing what
some lawyer puts under your nose. These lawyers, and properly so, in their zeal and advocacy and their enthusiasm are going to state
the case for their side in these findings as
strongly as they possibly can. 'Vhen these
findings get to the courts of appeal they won't
be worth the paper they are written on as far
as assisting the court of appeal in determining
why the judge decided the case.' Seminars for
Newly Appointed United States District
Judges (1963), p. 166."
While the factual findings of the trial court are
not to be rejected "out-of-hand" if supported by evidence, appellant does not so contend with respect to
the so-called "findings" in this case. This points up the
second failure of the findings to meet the requirements
of Rule 52. The findings do not include any specific
or direct findings on the fundamental issues of fact
before the court which the rules require. Harmon v.
Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962);
Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278
P.2d 284 (1954); Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d
246 (10th Cir. 1965). It is appellant's position that the
trial court made no finding of fact with regard to the
specific conduct of Vincent Chiodo on which appellant
5

relied as justification for the discharge of Vincent c
Chiodo. The trial court could not, in fact, find that
Vincent Chiodo had not engaged in the alleged con. c
duct because the evidence of such conduct is clear. 'i\That 2
the trial court did was to conclude that the actions of
Vincent Chiodo did not provide a legal basis for his
discharge-in light of the community morals at the
time. Even the findings prepared by respondent's coun·
sel do not purport to find, as a fact, that the alleged
conduct of Vincent Chiodo did not occur. Said find·
ings merely conclude that Vincent Chiodo was dis·
charged "without just cause and excuse." This conclusion is a result of the trial court's erroneous view
of the law applicable to termination of employment .
contracts having a specified duration.
Appellant can hardly attack the findings of fact as
to the specific conduct of Vincent Chiodo because there
are no such findings. If findings had been prepared by
respondent's counsel and they had been contrary to the
facts as shown by the evidence then they would have .
been attacked on that ground. Defendant did file its
"Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and to the Proposed Judg· ·
ment" (R. 678) in an effort to cause the court to make
findings relating to specific conduct of Vincent Chiodo.
However, these objections were overruled "out-of·
hand" and the findings prepared by plaintiff's counsel
were "mechanically adopted."
It is recognized that what Vincent Chiodo did or
did not do is a matter of fact, but the legal consequence
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of such acts is clearly a matter of law. There are no findings of fact relating to the specific charges of misconduct
of Vincent Chiodo and, therefore, this Court should
and must look to the underlying evidence. It is appellant's position that its discharge of Vincent Chiodo was
legally justifiable because of his proven misconduct
as outlined in our opening brief. The trial court made
no finding that such conduct did not in fact occur, but
in its oral opinion attempted to find a legal excuse for
its general conclusion that despite such conduct on his
part plaintiff was entitled to recover. Appellant submits the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding
that no justifiable cause existed for the discharge of
Vincent Chiodo.
The failure of counsel for plaintiff to prepare and
submit specific :findings of fact as required by Rule 52
could be attributed either to a fear that following the
court's oral opinion in framing :findings of fact and
conclusions of law would expose all too clearly the
court's erroneous view of the law or to a concern that
specific findings in accord with the conclusions of law
would result in :findings of fact that the trial court would
reject as contrary to its view of the evidence. The resulting camouflage of generalities is not entitled to be regarded as a shield to preclude this court from finding
and correcting the erroneous conclusions of law of the
court below.
A recent opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, written by District Judge Christensen,
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reviews the requirements for findings under Rule 52.
Featherstone v. Barash, supra p. 5. Judge Christensen concludes at page 250:
"And when findings wholly fail to resolve in
any meaningful way the basic issues of fact in
dispute, they become clearly insufficient to permit the reviewing court to decide the case at all,
except to remand it for proper findings by the
trial court."
This step is not necessary in the case at bar as this
court has before it the oral opinion of the trial court
which may be considered together with the findings.
Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344,
294 P .2d 689 ( 1956). This court there noted that where
the findings are inadequate, as they are in the case at
bar, an opinion or memorandum of decision of the trial
court may be consulted. Such resort to the oral opinion
of Judge Jones announcing the basis for his conclusion
that plaintiff should recover (R. 588-592} clearly shows
the errors of law committed below.
III. THE ACTIONS OF VINCENT CHIODO DURING THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WERE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.
A. Payroll Padding.

Respondent's brief demonstrates an ability to
rationalize and find excuses for conduct which is generally regarded by right thinking people as improper
and dishonest. The most striking example of this ability

8

is respondent's efforts to gloss over the documentary
evidence of falsification of payroll records by Vincent
Chiodo for his son, Don Chiodo.
On page 25 of his brief, respondent argues that
while it is true that the payroll records of Bear River
Telephone Company were falsified by Vincent Chiodo
and by Mr. Staples at the direction of Vincent Chiodo,
this falsification was justified because of "the answering
testimony . . . that Don Chiodo had time coming to
him because of work that he had been required to do
for Bear River during his vacation period and some
extensive night work which he had performed for Bear
River without charge."
Even if this excuse were accepted as being true,
which it is not, it would not justify the preparation of
what was patently a false and fraudulently written
report. If Don Chiodo had time coming, his time record,
while he was absent from the state, could very well have
shown his contention without the obvious and deliberate
falsification of company records. The very fact that the
plaintiff is trapped by written evidence of his willingness to change facts to support his own purposes is
strong evidence that the other testimony introduced by
him is suspect.
In a strained effort to show that it was not wrongful for Vincent Chiodo to falsify payroll records, defendant points to the testimony of Mr. Staples who testified that Vincent Chiodo told him to tell the truth if he
was ever called as a witness. It is really rather amazing
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that plaintiff can hope to prove a fact by taking two
entirely unrelated statements - bring them together as
one and prove the desired fact. It is true that Mr. Staples
testified that Vincent Chiodo told him and other employees to tell the truth when Vincent Chiodo was
telling them that he was going to have a court battle
over his contract as early as six months after he sold his
Bear River Telephone Company stock to General
Waterworks Corporation (R. 324). It is entirely untrue that Vincent Chiodo ever told Mr. Staples to tell
the truth regarding his fraudulent reporting of Don
Chiodo's time and it was only through the process of
discovery that this fact was ascertained by defendant.
There is no evidence that there was anything whatever
said to Mr. Staples by Vincent Chiodo with respect to
the false payroll reporting except to instruct him what
to write down.
The excuse proposed by plaintiff, that Don Chiodo
had time coming, is not supported by anything stronger
than Don Chiodo's self-serving declaration that he was
diligent and worked many hours overtime. The record
(Ex. 104) shows that he was actually paid for 2041;4
hours of overtime in 1962 in addition to his having been
allowed 33.1 days off from work on holidays, vacation
and jury duty. Exhibit 104 shows that Don Chiodo was
actually off work and on vacation over 15 days in 1962
and the company policy would permit him only 15 days
of vacation (R. 418). In addition to his days away
from work, the overtime paid him and his claim that he
was doing subcontract work for Max Fonnesbeck for
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which he received at least $3,700 over a period of a year
and a half makes his excuse for falsification of payroll
records incredible and beyond belief.
The statement "that there was nothing wrongful
or hidden with respect to Don Chiodo's taking nine days
off" and that Vincent Chiodo had a "clear conscience
and freedom from guilt" (Br. 25-26) all because he had
often told his employees he would have a court battle
over his employment contract and that they should tell
the truth if called as witnesses is indeed remarkable.
Clearly Vincent Chiodo felt that he was in the right in
everything he did. He apparently believed that he could
sell his company and continue to exercise the same control over the company as manager for a new owner as
he did while manager for himself. This attitude is demonstrated by the following statement from respondent's
brief (p. 33) :
"Plaintiff did become exercised on several
occasions because of the irritations that developed
as a result of New London's interference and
failure to permit him to manage the company
as had been agreed. Under all of the circumstances it appeared that plaintiff exercised a
remarkable amount of restraint."
There can be little doubt that a great deal of the friction
between Vincent Chiodo and the other officers of Bear
River Telephone Company was a result of his feeling
that he had the right to do as he pleased with the company
without control or direction from the owners of the
company. There was no such right granted Vincent
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Chiodo, but his assumption that his employment contract
gave him such right may help to explain how he could
rationalize to the point where he convinced himself that
all his problems were caused by the fact that his superiors
informed him from time to time how they desired the
company to be operated.
On pages 26-29 of his brief, respondent once again
attempts to prove a given fact by connecting unrelated
statements made as to separate unrelated facts or occurrences together as if they were related. This is equivalent
to a Bible reader finding a statement that "Cain slew
Abel" and an admonition by Christ that one should "go
and do likewise" and prove by that that Christ approved
of murder. Steve Anderson testified (R. 353-355) that
he helped splice aerial cable shown on Exhibit 58. This
cable was at plant 78 as identified by Mr. Fonnesbeck
(R. 226). Plaintiff's reply brief reports the testimony
of Don Chiodo relative to Exhibit 53 (R. 543-545)
which related to underground conduit installation at
the Thiokol R & D plant and argues that because Don
Chiodo testified that he did some correction of the
Henkels-McCoy splicing with company help on company time that the testimony of Steve Anderson is
"unsupported by any evidence, is false, for the testimony established that the cable splicing was not part of
the Fonnesbeck contract at all .... " The underground
conduit at the R & D plant had nothing to do with
splicing aerial cable at plant 78 about which Steve
Anderson testified and for which splicing Max Fonnesbeck paid Don Chiodo $2,000.00 (R. 230). The plain
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fact is that there is no competent evidence to show that
Steve Anderson did not do exactly what he said he did,
i.e., help Don Chiodo, on Bear River Telephone Company time, splice the aerial cable at plant 78 which was
under contract to Max Fonnesbeck and under subcontract to Don Chiodo for splicing.

On page 29 of his brief, respondent attempts to
excuse Vincent Chiodo causing the company to pay his
14-year-old granddaughter $354.20 for delivering telephone directories that were delivered by Don Chiodo
and his wife while Don Chiodo was on Bear River
Telephone Company time by alleging that Mr. Warner
had himself delivered directories for Bear River Telephone Company and had been paid. What plaintiff
forgets is that Mr. Warner did his delivery on his own
time and that even if he had done it on Bear River
Telephone Company time it would not excuse Vincent
Chiodo from paying his granddaughter for doing work
which Don Chiodo did on company time.
While respondent accuses appellant of making
baseless accusations (Br. 27), of beating a "hasty retreat" from a previous position (Br. 26), of "desperation" in attempts to justify respondent's discharge (Br.
29) and of dredging up evidence (Br. 23), it is submitted that such claims - with no support in any evidence-should not be a substitute for an examination of
the facts.
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B. Instructions From Donald Bell.

It is untrue that defendant ever abandoned the
defense of the failure of Vincent Chiodo to comply with
instructions from Mr. Bell as one of the bases for the
discharge of Vincent Chiodo as alleged on page 23 of
respondent's brief. Also, it did not affirmatively appear
from any of the evidence that Vincent Chiodo had substantially complied with said instructions. The testimony
of Mr. Bell revealed that Vincent Chiodo never answered
his letter but that he had his attorney, Calvin Rampton,
write a letter for him in which general propositions were
set forth giving no bona fide explanation of what was
requested ( R. 170; 178-182) .
One of the items requested by Mr. Bell's letter
(Ex. 46, para. 6} was an explanation of why Thiokol
had not been billed for approximately $1,500.00 in
additional charges for WATS service retroactive to
June 6, 1963. These are the same charges about which
Mr. Warner testified that Vincent Chiodo instructed
him to furnish no informa tion to New London ( R. 439) :
"Q. As a result of this letter you received,
what did you do?

"A. I took the letter to Mr. Chiodo.
"Q. What did he say?

"A. He said that anything pertaining to the
watts bands charges was to be referred directly
to him, that I was to make no communication
to anyone in New London regarding them."
and also about which Vincent Chiodo said (R. 444) :
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" ... if they can't figure out that they are
losing or making money from those figures, that
that was their fa ult, that it didn't mean anything
to us here."
As the preparation for the trial of this lawsuit
revealed even stronger justification for the discharge
of Vincent Chiodo than his failure to furnish the information demanded by Mr. Bell, defendant has naturally
placed primary emphasis on its strongest points and has
not placed great emphasis on what would otherwise be
ample justification for Vincent Chiodo's discharge. This
is in no way an abandonment by Bear River Telephone
Company of the defense based upon the default of Vincent Chiodo in failing to furnish the information sought
by Mr. Bell.
C. Condonation Of Respondent's Insubordination.

On pages 31 and 32 of his brief, respondent quotes
from Am. J ur. to the effect that retention of an employee after actual discovery of an act of misconduct
will in some circumstances amount to condoning the act.
In some circumstances this may well be true, but in the
case of Vincent Chiodo those acts which were discovered
before commencement of this lawsuit were never condoned 1 and it was only because of remarkable forebearance that Vincent Chiodo was not terminated long
before he was. The letter of Mr. Butcher (Ex. 25)
clearly states that if Vincent Chiodo continued to fail
to obey orders and continued to foment trouble he would
be fired. There is certainly nothing in the record of this
1

See e.g., Ex. 11, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 46, 49.
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case to indicate that Vincent Chiodo's actions were con.
doned. On the contrary, there were warnings given with
respect to each infraction, culminating when Vincent
Chiodo was discharged because Mr. Bell finally became
convinced that "he was impossible to live with. . ..
Impossible for anybody to get along with" ( R. 176).
This action was not taken until all efforts to obtain the
cooperation of Vincent Chiodo had failed (R. 171-176).
The reluctance of Bear River to take the final step of
discharge, despite Chiodo's deliberate provocations, was
not condonation but out of consideration for the per·
sonal relationship of Chiodo and his family to the company. For plaintiff to claim condonation in such cir·
cumstances does indeed put strain upon the quality of
mercy.
D. Disclosure Of Confidential Information.

On pages 36 and 37 of his brief, respondent states
that Vincent Chiodo was justified in advising the Public
Service Commission of Utah and the R.E.A. of pending
negotiations between Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company and General Waterworks Corporation for the exchange of Bear River Telephone Com·
pany. Mr. Chiodo testified (R. 40-41) that he went to a
meeting in Denver at the request of Mr. Sanders where
he was informed of the pending negotiations. He testified in pertinent part (R. 40-41):
"A. 'Ve were informed by Mr. Sanders that
his firm had found it convenient to trade the
property to A. T. & T., who in turn had con·
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tacted Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com1;mny for some sort of a trade; that
the Mountam States Company would take over
all of the employees except Vincent Chiodo, and
that he was through.
"Q. What did you say?

"A. I was shocked and I recall saying under
my breath and"Q. Well, now what did you say to them? I
don't care what you said under your breath.

"A. I didn't say anything to them.
"Q. Well, just tell me what you said.

"A. Other than that I would be willing to cooperate, that I suppose my contract could be
compromised, but received no further comment."
While Vincent Chiodo said nothing about Mr. Sanders'
agreement to honor the contract, Mr. Bell testified without contradiction that this information was given to
Vincent Chiodo by both Mr. Sanders and Mr. Bell.
Mr. Bell testified (R. 109-110):
"Q. Now in this conversation when it was
made clear to Mr. Chiodo that if the exchange
were made with the Mountain States people that
they probably wouldn't want him, was anything
said to him by either you or Mr. Sanders with
respect to what you would do on his contract?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What was said?
"A. I recall that Mr. Sanders made the
statement to Mr. Vince Chiodo, in outlining the
possible exchange of properties, that it would
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not be possible for Mountain States or that
Mountain States would not be interested in taking Mr. Chiodo, Mr. Vince Chiodo, with the
trade. But that he would see or that we would
see, Bear River Telephone Company would see
. contract was hon.'
I assume he meant, that his
ored. And I recall myself assuring him of this
before the meeting broke up, before we separated."
Mr. Bell also testified that this same information was
communicated to Mr. Rampton, Vincent Chiodo's lawyer (R. 111-112):
"Q. Now why didn't you tell me when I called
you on the phone that you'd take care of .Mr.
Chiodo?

"A. Certainly it was my recollection that we
didn't leave any doubt in your mind that we had
every intention of observing our contract with
Mr. Chiodo. I have no other recollection.
"Q. Weren't our negotiations pretty much on
a 'maybe we will and maybe we won't' basis when
you and I broke off?

"A. Not to my recollection, sir.
"Q. It's your recollection that that you gave
me assurance that the -

"A. That we would observe his contract.
"Q. Wasn't it a fact that what you said to me,
'Well, we might have to'?
"A. No, I think what I said to you was, '"Te
have no choice, and we have no intention of doing
otherwise'.''
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It was obviously not fears for his employment contract which caused Chiodo to run to the R.E.A. and the
Public Service Commission of Utah contrary to express
instructions from his superiors, but a desire to prevent
the trade with Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company - a matter which did not concern him
in light of Sanders' commitment to honor his employment contract.
E. Disloyalty.

On page 38 of his brief, respondent attempts to
excuse his underhanded attempt to act as agent for a
third party in a negotiation with his principal by asking
to whom he owed loyalty as manager of Bear River.
Respondent concludes that as manager of Bear River
"the attempted purchase of stock from General Waterworks Corporation was not a breach of any responsibility
that plaintiff might owe as manager of Bear River Telephone Company." It is obvious that respondent still does
not believe that as a company officer and director his
responsibility and fiduciary duty is to the corporate
shareholders. See, e.g., Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah
183, 228 Pac. 906 (1924); Glen Allen Mimng Co. v.
Park Galena Mimng Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231
(1931) . The shareholder of Bear River Telephone Company was General Waterworks Corporation.
It is recognized that Vincent Chiodo had a deep

emotional involvement in the Bear River Telephone
Company and that he had a strong resentment against
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph. It is under-
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standable that Vincent Chiodo would, in looking to hi)
own desires, do everything he could to prevent the Bear
River Telephone Company from passing to a compan»
which he had been fighting many years. 'Vhat plaintiff
forgets is that after he disposes of his property he has no
legal right to control its destiny from that point on. His
excuse that he went to the Utah Public Service Commission and the R.E.A. "to find out what the legalities
might be on that" is simply not true. He went to his
attorney to see about the "legalities" and he went to the
Utah Public Service Commission and the R.E.A. to
block the contemplated transfer. If the contemplated
transfer had taken place, Vincent Chiodo would have his
employment contract honored as was told him by .Mr.
Sanders and Mr. Bell and he had no right to attempt to
satisfy his own desires as to the ownership of Bear River
Telephone Company once he had sold it to General
Waterworks.
Plaintiff alleges (Br. 38-39) that Vincent Chiodo
not only wanted to protect himself but "also clearly
wished to preserve Bear River Telephone Company and
insure that it would be owned and operated by a responsible organization." As a resident of the Tremonton
area, he may have had such an interest but his overriding obligation to Bear River Telephone Company
was to the actual owners of Bear River Telephone Company and his obligation was not to take it upon himself
to find an owner more suitable to his own interest. His
interference in the Mountain States negotiations and
his attempt to buy the company for Independent Tele-

20

phone Company are but two instances of Vincent
Chiodo's volatile nature and effort to do what he wished
in utter disregard of his duties to his employer, demonstrated over and over again in the record in this case.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL
DECISION WITH RESPECT TO APPLICA-

TION OF THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE
TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IN
ISSUE WAS CORRECT.

Beginning on page 47 of his brief, respondent sets
forth his contention that the employment agreement in
this case can be varied by parole evidence and cites
cases which he contends support his contention. None
of the cited cases are in point here. The reason that
these cases are inapposite is that there is no basis for contention in the present case that the written contract was
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one construction.
In Read v. Forced Underfiring Corp., 82 Utah
529, 26 P.2d 325 (1933), this Court bottomed its right
to look to the circumstances at the time the contract was
entered into because of the use of the term "net profits"
in the contract which term the Court felt was ambiguous.
Respondent in this case refers to no language in the
written agreement which is ambiguous or which he
believes to mean something different from what appellant believes it to mean. However, at page 51 of his brief,
respondent points to the language "to confirm our
understanding . . . " and argues out that "confirm"
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means "to complete or establish that which was incomplete or uncertain .... " Appellant agrees with this meaning. However, the contention by respondent that tlus
language can be interpreted to incorporate by reference
all the prior negotiations whether written or oral is not
supported by any authority cited by him.
In Hawaiian Equipment Company v. Eimco Corp.,
115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794 (1949) there was some
question as to the identification of goods covered by the
contract and this Court said that parole evidence may
be received "for a limited purpose." That purpose was
to "apply the memorandum to the subject matter."
In Maw v. Noble, IO Utah 2d 440, 354 P.2d 121
( 1960) this Court stated:
"We are in agreement with the well-recognized rule urged by the defendants that where
there is uncertainty or ambiguity the contract
should be strictly construed against him who
draws it. But it is to be kept in mind that this
rule applies only where there is some genuine
lack of certainty, and not too strained or merely
fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be
indulged in. The primary and a more fundamental rule is that the contract must be looked
at realistically in the light of the circumstances
under which it was entered into, and if the intent
of the parties can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty it must be given effect." (P. 123.)
The case of Ross v. Stricker, 275 P.2d 991 (Okla.
1953) is concerned only with the question of whether the
period of an agreement may be proven by parole evi22

dence where no duration is stated in the writing. The
court held, with one strong dissent, that because the
writing in issue was only a memorandum of a prior oral
agreement and was not a contract, parole evidence of
the duration of the contract was admissible. The present
case does not involve any question concerning the duration of the employment agreement and is not a mere
written memorandum of a prior agreement. The agreement at issue in this case is the only contract entered
into by the parties.
In Laskey v. Rubell Corp., 100 N.E.2d 140 (Ct.
App. N.Y., 1951), the court determined that the con-

tract in question was partly oral and partly written
because the parties had actually entered into an oral
contract and then later reduced a portion of the agreement to writing. The writing was entitled "Terms and
Conditions of Employment" and was signed by the
parties. The written document stated that the employment contract was "terminable, at any time, at the
option of the Company" but the plaintiff desired to
prove that the oral agreement was for employment for
one year. The court ruled that parole evidence could not
be introduced to vary the written agreement and then
in dictum stated that the portion of the oral contract
which was not reduced to writing could be proven by
parole evidence if there were any dispute about the terms
of the oral agreement. The holding and dictum of the
Laskey case are of no importance in the present case
because there never was an oral contract between the
parties hereto and the written contract is the only agree-
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ment ever entered into by them. Even if General 'Vater.
works Corporation were the party defendant, which
it is not, there is no evidence that the parties entered into
an oral contract prior to the execution of the employ.
ment agreement.
It may well be that both respondent and appellant

agree as to the law governing parole evidence, but differ
as to its application here. Respondent points to no ambiguity in the written agreement (Ex. 6) but relies as
did the court below (R. 589) when it reversed its earlier
conclusion ( R. 584) on the use of the word "confirm"
in the second paragraph of Exhibit 6. It is submitted
that the phrase in its context and the quoted definition
from Black's Law Dictionary clearly connote the letter
is intended as an integration of all earlier oral "understandings'' - the classic example of the application of
the parole evidence rule. A reading of the rest of the
letter agreement "confirms" this intent. It covers all the
essentials of the employment arrangement - terms,
duties and salary. The last paragraph of the letter
proper and the acceptance below "reconfirm" that intent.
Any attempt to conjure an ambiguity or patent omission
of an essential term can only make a mockery of the
rule and its purpose. The original decision of the trial
court (R. 584) was sound on this point. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d l, 354 P.2d
559, 563 (1960).

V. THE ALLEGED MALICE OF DE·
FENDANT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS
CASE.
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Respondent in his so-called "Statement of Facts"
(Br. 19) claims the discharge of Vincent Chiodo's two
sons demonstrate malice and bad faith on the part of
defendant. Such charge is groundless. Vincent Chiodo's
sons had no vested rights of employment and their continued employment was at the pleasure of the employer.
Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106
307 P.2d 210 (1957); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, II Utah 2d l, 354 P.2d 559. Respondent points
out that their work was not criticized and they were fired
because they were "fomenting trouble" and not because
their work was unsatisfactory as stated on the termination slip. It is hard to imagine how an individual's work
could be more unsatisfactory than when he is fomenting
trouble. Vincent Chiodo commenced this very action
against the Bear River Telephone Company on January
9, 1964, yet his sons were retained until March 13, 1964,
when it became apparent that the sons' loyalty was
more to Vincent Chiodo than it was to the company.
They had to be terminated in order to continue the
company's business without involving the employees
in problems with the Chiodo family.
The letter of James L. Morrison to Mr. Calvin L.
Rampton, which plaintiff also cites as showing malice,
was a letter from one attorney to another in which
terminology common among lawyers was used. It is
commonly said by lawyers that a witness is "destroyed"
by certain evidence. Respondent in this case, while making accusations that appellant is desperately attempting
to justify its discharge of Vincent Chiodo, is himself

doing exactly what he accuses appellant of doing. To
attempt to color the motives of appellant by claims of
malice and bad faith because of a letter from one attorney
to another is certainly grasping at straws. The testimony
of James L. Morrison confirms that he was merely
referring to the belief that proof of Vincent Chiodo's
activities would destroy his reputation for honesty and
integrity which he presumably had in the community.
Finally, plaintiff's claim of malice was rejected by
the trial court and he has taken no appeal from that
ruling. To raise it here is a mere red herring directed to
plaintiff's emotional reactions rather than to the issues
before this Court.
CONCLUSION
A review of the record in this case amply demon·
strates that appellant established just cause for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo. The general conclusions cap·
tioned "Findings of Fact" are not supported by the
record and the trial court's theories in support of its
conclusion are contrary to law. The judgment below
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER W. BILLINGS
DALE E. ANDERSON
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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